Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we asked participants to perform a visual target detection task with peripheral cues. In the first part of the experiment, cues were not predictive of the side of occurrence of the incoming target. In the second part of the experiment, unbeknownst to the participants, cues became 80% predictive, thus inducing an endogenous orienting of spatial attention. Confirming previous results, in the second part response times (RTs) decreased for validly cued trials and increased for invalid trials. Half of the participants were subsequently able to correctly describe the cue-target relationships ('verbalizers'), thus demonstrating reflective consciousness of endogenous orienting. Also non-verbalizer participants showed a similar RT pattern, indicating the occurrence of endogenous orienting without reflective consciousness. Both groups of participants showed fronto-parietal activity typically observed in spatial attention tasks. Verbalizers, in addition, demonstrated stronger activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), consistent with the proposed role of this structure in purposeful behaviour and in the monitoring of its consequences. The extensive pattern of connectivity of the ACC is ideally suited to integrate the activity of the large neural assemblies necessary for reflective consciousness to emerge.
Introduction
Changes in brain functioning during cognitive activities may provide hints concerning the neural correlates of consciousness (see Rodriguez et al., 1999) . In recent years, this idea has prompted an increasing interest for research on consciousness in cognitive neuroscience. Although it remains unclear how to establish precise causal relationships between brain events and subjective experience (Dalla Barba, 2002) , patterns of neural activity which correlate in a lawful manner with the development of a determinate subjective experience can constrain models of consciousness, and may offer insights for developing rehabilitation strategies for brain-damaged patients.
The phenomenological tradition has often distinguished between primary and reflective forms of consciousness (see Bartolomeo & Dalla Barba, 2002; Marcel, 1988; Vermersch, 2000) . Primary consciousness refers to the basic condition of being aware of something. This ability is shared by humans and animals with limited semantic capabilities and no true language (Edelman & Tononi, 2000) . Humans are also capable of (presumably) higher-order forms of consciousness, which can involve linguistic abilities. In particular, reflective consciousness allows subjects to perceive and describe their own actions and thoughts. This distinction may help explaining apparently bizarre results from experimental psychology, such as the finding that people observing an array of letters for a very short time are well aware of having seen all the letters, but can name only a subset of them (Sperling, 1960) . Thus, in Sperling's words, "at the time of exposure, and for a few tenths of a second thereafter, observers have two or three times as much information available as they can later report" (Sperling, 1960, p. 26) . In these cases, the short presentation time may have allowed participants to develop primary, or pre-reflective consciousness of
